What is the relationship between law and development in the post-colonial era? Are particular types of legal institutions associated with particular modes of economic organization or trajectories of economic development? Is the relationship between law and development causal, in the sense that specific legal reforms cause specific development outcomes? These questions are not of merely academic interest. The answers have major implications for policy-makers. In this essay we trace major currents in the history of ideas about these topics, ranging from Max Weber and his successors to proponents of the "right to development." We then identify key limitations in the intellectual frameworks that have been dominant through the turn of the twenty-first century. Those limitations include: failure to draw upon the experience of countries in the global South; misplaced reliance upon problematic conceptual dichotomies such as
law and development movement-were not the most important forms of social control. Instead of using contract law, for instance, members of an ethnic group or kinship network can effectively guarantee the credibility of agreements by using social pressures to resolve disputes (Greif 2006) . They also argued that when legal institutions were effective means of social control, they were prone to capture by powerful political interests. This meant that there was no guarantee that legal institutions could help promote the interests of less-advantaged groups. For example, the movement's emphasis on a modernized legal profession risked increasing the price of legal services and making legal decision-making more formalistic, thus reducing the ability of the less-well off to access justice. Trubek and Galanter's despairing analysis continues to resonate among skeptics of legal reform initiatives sponsored by Western actors.
New institutional economics (NIE)
The recent revival of interest in law and development can be largely traced to developments in economics. In 1993 Douglass North won the Nobel Prize for a body of work suggesting that a great deal of the variation in economic performance, across space and time, can be explained by variations in institutions (see generally, North 1990). Although North's best-known work focused on the history of the U.S. and Western Europe, the influence of the "new institutional economics" in development economics has been profound. Rather than attributing poor economic performance to factors such as climate, endowments of minerals or arable land, or the genetic makeup of the population, it is now standard to search for institutional causes and solutions. Economists' definitions of the term "institution" typically encompass legal institutions.
As a consequence, a great deal of research on the relationship between law and development is now being conducted by economists rather than legal scholars.
Most new institutional economists adopt a neo-Weberian framework. Their hypothesis is that legal systems composed primarily of previously established norms enforced impartially and predictably by specialized officials-attributes often referred to compendiously as "the rule of law"-are universally conducive to economic growth (or other desirable outcomes, such as literacy rates and life expectancy). Property rights and contracts are regarded as especially important. Protection of property rights, for instance, is argued to be necessary to increase incentives for investment and decrease incentives for inefficient competition over scarce resources. Enforcement of contracts-especially contracts that transfer interests in property-is seen as necessary to create markets that allow goods, services, and credit to be allocated to people who value them most highly. So for instance, Hernando De Soto (1989) advocates giving squatters in Peru and elsewhere formal title to land to allow them to share in the benefits of land markets.
Although the NIE may have been inspired initially by case studies of the North, its empirical studies now often include countries in the South. Cross-country studies generally find that "institutions matter," consistent with the theoretical predictions. There are, however, important caveats. China is a particularly enigmatic case, a large country with weak indicators of institutional quality and high rates of economic growth. Such studies also provide limited support for claims that legal institutions generally, much less any particular legal institutions, are significant. This is because they rarely attempt to isolate the influence of specific institutions.
Finally, cross-country studies shed little light on within-country variations in the role of institutions, such as how institutions affect people from different classes or ethnic groups, or in urban as opposed to rural areas. Within-country studies that incorporate these factors often reveal that the roles of institutions are rather context-specific. In Ghana, for example, where property rights in rural areas are governed by customary law, country-level indicators of the "strength of property rights" over-simplify a complex reality in which the strength of rights varies between urban and rural areas, from village to village, with the political power of the competing claimants to land, and depending on whether one is considering the right to use or to alienate land ( 
Varieties of capitalism
The "varieties of capitalism" approach was developed by scholars of comparative political economy, focused primarily on developed economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). Proponents classify countries as either "liberal market economies" (e.g., the U.S.) or "coordinated market economies" (e.g., Germany). Although the framework has been applied primarily to OECD countries, Hall and Soskice (and others) argue that it can be applied to developing countries as well.
The varieties of capitalism literature offers a sophisticated theory of institutional change,
showing how institutions co-evolve with patterns of economic activity. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the two ideal types of economies represent alternative ways of coordinating interactions among firms, employees, investors, consumers, shareholders, etc. Those interactions are shaped by local institutions and end up influencing, if not determining, macroeconomic policies and the overall structure of the economy. The relevant "institutions" include both rules enshrined in the formal legal system and informal rules such as shared expectations of appropriate behavior shaped by common experiences. A key claim is that nations will tend to develop complementary institutions, meaning institutions that increase the returns from one another. For instance, Hall and Soskice posit that capital markets that are relatively insensitive to current profitability complement long-term employment, whereas more profit-sensitive capital markets complement fluid labor markets. Accordingly, liberal market economies have tended to combine higher levels of stock market capitalization with lower levels of employment protection, whereas coordinated market economies have tended toward the opposite equilibrium.
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Chapter 12 Page 15 Proponents of the varieties of capitalism approach claim that both ideal types of economies can lead to satisfactory long-run economic performance, as evidenced by the roughly comparable performance of the U.S. and Germany. They do, however, suggest that differences in institutional structures lead to systematic differences in distribution of income and employment.
Institutions also determine firms' capacity for engaging in specific types of activities, including radical (as opposed to incremental) innovation.
This approach shares with the NIE the assumption that institutions determine economic outcomes. A distinctive feature is the emphasis on institutional interdependencies, i.e., the idea that both the structure and performance of any set of legal institutions might be shaped by the broader institutional context in which they operate. This implies that it is impossible to foresee the consequences of adopting particular institutions, or whether those institutions are optimal in any sense, without accounting for institutional interdependencies.
Human rights and the rule of law
While the NIE and varieties of capitalism approaches are primarily concerned with laws governing the conduct of private (i.e., non-state) actors, other approaches focus on laws that
Chapter 12 Page 16 regulate state action. The most prominent of these approaches connect development with respect for human rights and the rule of law, either directly or indirectly, and focus on legal mechanisms for achieving those objectives. In some cases, legal systems that manifest respect for human rights or the rule of law are viewed not just as means to promote economic or political development but also as ends in themselves. This non-instrumental understanding of the role of law represents a significant departure from other approaches to law and development.
The human rights movement originated in the work of activists seeking to rectify injustices Since the 1990s the idea that development includes respect for human rights has become increasingly accepted among mainstream development agencies (Uvin 2007 ). This idea is succinctly captured in Amartya Sen's (1999) influential concept of "development as freedom."
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The human rights approach argues that states have an obligation to "protect, respect, and promote" a set of universal and inalienable rights, for both instrumental and symbolic reasons.
There is, however, significant disagreement about how to define the rights that qualify as human rights, especially when it comes to social and economic rights. For instance, some instruments refer to the concept of a "right to development," defined as a right to a process of development that will result in the realization of all human rights and freedoms. While some proponents of the right to development interpret this as a collective right of a state, some scholars have argued that such collective rights depend on the existence of individual rights to development (Abi-Saab 1975) . At stake in this debate is whether states can defend projects that promote national economic development at the expense of certain individuals or communities-a dam might be a case in point-in the name of the human right to development.
Under rights-based approaches, more than in any other theoretical framework, legal institutions play a key role in defining desired development outcomes. Human rights are typically set out in treaties or constitutions and defined by courts, both domestic and international, in the course of litigation. The resulting concentration of power in lawyers and courts may be in tension with democratic principles (Waldron 2006) , although, as Sen (1999) points out, this is less of a concern if the rights that merit legal protection are determined through democratic processes.
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There are also reasons to doubt whether courts or other human rights bodies are competent to resolve effectively the broad range of public policy issues that implicate social and economic rights. Take, for instance, the right to health: in Brazil and Colombia much of the health care budget is consumed by judicially-mandated expenditures resulting from a massive volume of individual claims. This has undermined the ability of policy-makers and health care professionals to plan how to best use available resources (Yamin and Gloppen 2011) .
Independent of litigation, human rights discourse is believed to be an effective way of mobilizing groups to press for social change. rights, but also all the guarantees that need to be in place for such human rights to be protected.
Thus, rule of law would include independent judiciaries, non-corrupt bureaucracies, and functional legislatures. In contrast, others have resisted the thick conception as it equates rule of law with a particular (as opposed to universal) concept of justice. Instead, they propose a thin conception of the rule of law based on procedural rights that guarantee due process, but nothing beyond that. Regardless of how it is defined, promotion of the rule of law can be justified as either an end in itself or, as we have already seen with NIE scholars, as a means to achieve other 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
TWAIL is a movement that seeks a more equitable international legal regime. The first generation of TWAIL scholars claimed that the post-colonial international economic order was characterized by systemic exploitation of Third World countries by Western nations and that
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The movement proposed institutional reforms to better attune international organizations to the interests of developing countries and to reflect their numerical superiority, such as majority rule in votes of international organizations (Bedjaoui 1979) .
Since the 1990s, a second generation of TWAIL scholars has analyzed not only formal governance structures in international law but also the relationships of power that determine how such structures operate. In addition to being more interdisciplinary than the first generation, the second generation is more skeptical about the liberating potential for international law. On the one hand, focusing on processes of adaptation represents a promising reorientation of the field of law and development. This approach is sensitive to the complexity of interactions between legal systems and societies and points away from the idea that institutional designs are or should be static. On the other hand, these approaches threaten to dampen dialogue between academics and policy-makers by suggesting that such processes are too complex to permit
Chapter 12 Page 32 intentional manipulation. This would cast a long shadow upon an aspiration that has characterized law and development scholarship since its inception, namely, of providing guidance for action.
Experimentalism
Most of the approaches discussed so far are based upon firmly held beliefs about causal relationships between legal institutions and development outcomes. In contrast, experimentalists start from the premise that we know very little about such relationships, and they value using experiments to untangle them. Rather than a theory of law and development, experimentalism In development economics experimentalism is associated with another process: randomized controlled trials (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). In such trials, subjects are randomly assigned to either a group that is subjected to the intervention, the "treatment group," or a group that has not been subjected to the intervention, the "control group." Different outcomes between the treatment group and the control group are presumed to be caused by the intervention.
One of the few examples of a randomized controlled trial of a legal intervention involved police reform in the state of Rajasthan, India (Banerjee et al. 2012) . The experiment consisted of four different interventions to improve police performance and public perception of the police. While some randomly selected police stations were subjected to one type of intervention, others remained as the control group. The experiment showed that two mechanisms-training and freezes on transfers of police staff-improved performance and perceptions of the police. In contrast, the other two-placing community observers in police stations and weekly duty rotations-showed no results. Scholars suggested that failed implementation may explain the different result, as the latter depended on sustained cooperation of communities or local authorities, whereas the former did not.
Practical, legal, and ethical problems limit the scope for experimenting with legal norms, especially those that apply directly to individuals. Advocates for randomized controlled trials to evaluate legal reforms in developed countries argue that these problems are not insurmountable (Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin 2011). They do not, however, focus on the potential challenges associated with running such experiments in developing countries. Where is a government to find people with the expertise and integrity to design, conduct, and interpret the results of these kinds of experiments in good faith? Do they have legal authority to apply legal norms selectively? Is it ethical to experiment with the welfare of people on the brink of subsistence? Without answers to these questions it is hard to determine the extent to which experimentalism will help the field of law and development move forward.
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Conclusion: The search for meta-principles
For most of the post-war era, dominant approaches in law and development have involved claims about how specific legal mechanisms invariably produce desirable development outcomes.
Emerging approaches take better account of the complexity and dynamism of relationships between law and development, especially as they are manifested in the Global South. They acknowledge that legal systems are composed of many interdependent parts that interact in complex ways across artificial divides between public or private, domestic or international, common law or civil law, or legal or non-legal norms, in an endless process of adaptation.
Unfortunately, approaches that acknowledge these complexities struggle to identify empirical regularities in the relationship between specific legal institutions and development outcomes.
Often the particularities of legal systems in developing countries are fleshed out through careful case studies, which then resist generalizations. In contrast, regularities in processes of institutional change may be generalizable. This may explain why an intellectual quest for general principles of law and development has evolved into a search for meta-principles.
So far no single approach offers a well-developed set of overarching concepts and causal claims that can satisfactorily account for the varying relationships between law and development in the
